Articles Tagged with Equitable Distribution

Published on:

Hicks v. Hicks, 2022-NCCOA-139.

Facts: Plaintiff and Defendant attended a mediation to attempt to settle the Equitable Distribution and alimony parts of their case. In mediation, they reached a settlement and memorialized their terms in a consent order, entered in September of 2018. Among those terms, Defendant received a parcel of land with a requirement to refinance the loan to remove Plaintiff’s name and debt. Defendant also received another parcel of land, with a similar refinance provision. Finally, the consent order provided that Plaintiff shall pay a distributive award to Defendant for $87,500, on or before January 1, 2019. Defendant was having difficulty refinancing the loans on the parcels he received. Plaintiff’s counsel reached out the Defendant’s new counsel to discuss the issue of the loans, but then noticed that “Plaintiff” and “Defendant” on the distributive award provision were interchanged (the parties agreed that Plaintiff would be receiving the award). Plaintiff thus filed a Rule 60 motion on April 15, 2020, requesting that the court correct a clerical mistake under 60(a) or such other justifiable relief under 60(b)(6). Plaintiff and her attorney testified that it was the mutual agreement that Plaintiff receive the award, and Defendant pay it. The trial court granted relief under 60(b)(6) and amended the typo. Defendant appeals. Continue reading →

Published on:

Shropshire v. Shropshire, 2022-NCCOA-441.

Facts:

Plaintiff and Defendant separated and initiated a case for Equitable distribution (ED). Pursuant to a pretrial Order, the parties filed affidavits for the ED trial. Both parties listed retirement plans under the “marital property” section of the affidavit. This included the Plaintiff’s 401(k) plan. Furthermore, both parties designated that Plaintiff’s retirement plans had values to be determined for date of separation and “net” value. Under the section of the affidavit marked for “divisible property,” neither party listed any property.

In a hearing in August of 2018, the parties testified about ED. In October 2018, the trial court judge told the parties that evidence was going to be reopened so that evidence could be presented that showed the date of trial values for the retirement plans, as well as value of the marital residence. Plaintiff objected to the reopening and filed a motion to recuse.

The motion was denied in trial court and the reopening was allowed. The information was provided over objections, and a final ED order was entered. Plaintiff appealed. Continue reading →

Published on:

Wright v. Wright, 222 N.C. App. 309, 730 S.E.2d 218 (2012)

  • Facts: Plaintiff and Defendant married in 2002 and subsequently separated in 2008. Defendant was a professional football player in the NFL. While playing football, Defendant suffered significant injuries, three of which were sustained while he was married to Plaintiff. Defendant retired in 2008 due to those injuries. Defendant began receiving disability payments because of his retirement from the NFL. He also applied for permanent disability. These benefits are paid to former players. The trial court classified these disability benefits as deferred compensation programs and distributed them in equitable distribution. Defendant appealed.

Continue reading →

Published on:

Dozier v. Dozier, 2022-NCCOA-307 (unpublished) (2022)

 

In North Carolina, an Equitable Distribution (ED) judgment is a final court-ordered distribution of the marital assets. Unlike child support, alimony, or custody, these are not modifiable upon showing the court that there has been a substantial change in circumstances. A rule 60 motion is one that is essentially asking the court for relief from the judgment entered. There are many grounds for asking relief. In an interesting twist, one party sought to void one particular section of an ED judgment, rather than the whole thing.

Continue reading →

Published on:

In the previous blog, we covered appraisal as a method of valuation of property in the context of Equitable Distribution in a separation. Equitable Distribution (ED) in North Carolina is a legal process by which the court divides the marital property between the parties. The three steps in an ED determination are classification, valuation, and distribution, and today we continue with a look at valuation.

Continue reading →

Published on:

Equitable Distribution in North Carolina is a legal process by which the court divides the marital property between the parties. It involves three steps: 1) classifying the property as marital or separate (or some mix); 2) assigning value to the property; and 3) distributing the property in an equitable manner between the parties. We have written a lot with emphasis on the first step of the analysis, classification. This makes sense in that the court will only distribute marital assets and not touch the separate. So today we will talk about the second step, valuation.

Continue reading →

Published on:

Foxx v. Foxx, 2022-NCCOA-223 (5 April 2022) (unpublished).

Some statutes and case laws in North Carolina have a time component. In modifications of child support and custody, the trial court is sometimes required to make comparisons between the old facts and circumstances with the current ones in order to find whether there has been a substantial change in circumstances. Sometimes the old facts and circumstances just don’t exist because the prior order was a consent order. In these cases, trial courts ought to make findings about the facts in play at the time of the prior order, so as to make acceptable comparisons. In equitable distribution, one such statute asks the court to compare the income and estates of the parties at the time of the division of property. Again, it asks for a comparison at a specific point in time. Below is a case where the trial court did not make such comparison. Continue reading →

Published on:

Maddukuri v. Chintanippu, 2022-NCCOA-128 (1 March 2022)

Stipulations are often used to expedite portions of a case/trial so that there is no time wasted on them, allowing the court to focus on the issues that are actually in contention. The use of stipulations of fact is pretty common. It removes the inconvenience of having to show evidence of facts that no one contests. Stipulations can also be used for settlement. These allow for the concession between parties of some rights in return for others. Below is a case where the Court dealt with the potential withdrawal of a stipulation. Continue reading →

Published on:

Sam Willis and Sarah Willis were married in August 1981.  Sam filed his Complaint on March 28, 1985, seeking a divorce from bed and board, alimony, and equitable distribution.  Before the parties married, Sam sold Sarah a house and lot on Claremont Road.  Throughout the marriage, the couple lived at the Claremont Road property.  Sam made all of the mortgage payments during the marriage.  These payments amounted to $9,900.  Sarah appeals from the equitable distribution judgment entered pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20. Continue reading →

Published on:

Harris v. Harris, 352 S.E.2d 869, 84 N.C.App. 353 (N.C. App. 1987)

In the case above, the plaintiff was ordered to pay to defendant an Equitable Distribution (ED) distributive award in the amount of $23,706.82, but payment of the award was postponed until the parties’ youngest child reached age 18 or graduated from high school. The Court of Appeals reversed because, at the time, such a postponement would have extended the distributive award to seven years after the termination of the marriage. This was significant, as the court is not to order a distributive award that would be paid “over such an extended time period that the payment thereof will be treated by the Internal Revenue Service as ordinary income.” Here, the courts look to IRS regulations to prevent taxes on the transfer of property incident to divorce, and IRS rules say gains or losses that result from transfers are not treated as ordinary income if they relate to the cessation of the marriage. However, if a transfer occurs more than six years after the termination of the marriage, one presumes it is not related to the cessation of the marriage. 26 CFR § 1.1041-1T.  That would be rebuttable but involves more work. Continue reading →